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With the massive deployment of mobile devices in sensitive areas such as 
healthcare and defense, hardware reliability and security have become hot research topics 
in recent years. These topics, although different in definition, are usually correlated. This 
dissertation offers an in-depth treatment on enhancing the reliability and security of low 
power circuits and systems. The first part of the dissertation deals with the reliability of 
sub-threshold designs, which use supply voltage lower than the threshold voltage (Vth) of 
transistors to reduce power. The exponential relationship between delay and Vth 
significantly jeopardizes their reliability due to process variation induced timing 
violations. In order to address this problem, this dissertation proposes a novel selective 
body biasing scheme. In the first work, the selective body biasing problem is formulated 
as a linearly constrained statistical optimization model, and the adaptive filtering concept 
is borrowed from the signal processing community to develop an efficient solution. 
However, since the adaptive filtering algorithm lacks theoretical justification and 
guaranteed convergence rate, in the second work, a new approach based on semi-infinite 
programming with incremental hypercubic sampling is proposed, which demonstrates 
better solution quality with shorter runtime. The second work deals with the security of 
low power crypto-processors, equipped with Random Dynamic Voltage Scaling (RDVS), 
in the presence of Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attacks. This dissertation firstly 
demonstrates that the resistance of RDVS to CPA can be undermined by lowering power 
supply voltage. Then, an alarm circuit is proposed to resist this attack. However, the 
alarm circuit will lead to potential denial-of-service due to noise-triggered false alarms.  
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Symbol Description         
η                  Delay Factor 
Cs               Switching Load Capacitance 
s   Surface Potential 
Vdd                  Supply Voltage 
γ  Body Biasing Coefficient 
Vth               Threshold Voltage  
VT                  Thermal Voltage 
ρ               Sub-threshold Swing Parameter  
VSB                  Body Biasing Voltage 
Vth0  Threshold Voltage for VSB=0 
t                  Gate Delay without Vth Variation and body biasing  
t'               Gate Delay with Vth Variation   
t''                  Gate Delay with Vth Variation and body biasing 
A               Matrix with connection information of circuit  
T                  Target Delay of Circuit 
x               Decision Vector 
             Small Positive Number 
b  Dealy Improvement Vector 
p  Gate Power 
Pb  Gate Power with body biasing 
IN  Unit Vector 
μ  Step Size of Adaptive Filtering 
λ  Lagrange Multiplier 
   Positive Regularization Parameter   
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
With the massive deployment of mobile devices in sensitive areas such as 
healthcare and defense, hardware reliability and security have become hot research topics 
in recent years. These two topics, although different in definition, are usually correlated. 
This dissertation offers an in-depth treatment on enhancing the reliability and security of 
low power circuits and systems. 
 
1.1. RELIABILITY  
Both fabrication-time and run-time effects impact the reliability of integrated 
circuits (ICs). With the shrinking of feature size in complementary metal-oxide 
semiconductor (CMOS) technology, the fabrication-induced process variation, which 
may cause timing failure and impact the performance of circuits significantly, poses a 
major challenge for reliability of modern IC [62][63]. There are two different types of 
process variation, die-to-die variation and within-die variation. The die-to-die variation, 
resulting from wafer-to-wafer, impacts all transistors and interconnects on a die equally, 
and just effects the chip performance like frequency, leakage current etc. [64]. 
Conversely, the within die variations induces different electrical characteristics to 
different devices and interconnects within the same die. 
Different approaches have been proposed to improve the reliability modern ICs in 
super-threshold designs, like Statistical Static Timing Analysis (SSTA) [65] and body 
biasing compensation technology [66], etc. However, there are few works on the sub-
threshold designs, and this dissertation focuses on the effect of within die variation on 
sub-threshold designs. In fact, the effect of process variation on timing is extremely 
serious for sub-threshold design due to the exponential relationship between delay and 
Vth. Therefore, the first part of this dissertation focuses on solving timing problem caused 
by process variation in sub-threshold designs. 
 
1.2. SECURITY  
Mobile phones and computers are already the most common and basic 
communication tools now, and attacks to phones and computers keep increasing recently. 
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Considering that the phones and computers are able to access sensitive user data like 
bank information and photos etc., people are having higher and higher security 
requirements to these devices. In order to improve the security of electrical devices, both 
the security of software and hardware should be considered, and this dissertation focuses 
on the improvement of hardware security.  
Side-channel attack (SCA) is a very popular hardware attack method. SCA 
explores the secret information by measuring the emitted outputs from physical devices, 
which includes execution timing, power consumptions, electromagnetic leaks, and even 
thermal/acoustic emanations [60]. Published SCAs include simple power analysis (SPA), 
differential power analysis (DPA), correlation power analysis (CPA), collision attack [61] 
and leakage power analysis (LPA), etc. Among them, DPA and CPA are the most 
popular and effective ones, which have been reviewed by numerous researchers on 
various crypto-systems [60]. 
Both DPA and CPA are power analysis attack methods, and the attackers measure 
the dynamic power consumption, which is dissipated during the transistors switching. 
The same input plaintext always results in the same power trace with a given key, thus, 
attackers can aggregate the small deviations between the power traces to identify the 
correct key. To address this issue, random dynamic voltage scaling (RDVS) has been 
proposed in the literature, which is demonstrated to be effective against DPA and CPA 
[48][49].  However, the resistance of RDVS to CPA can be undermined through lowering 
off-chip power supply voltage, and the second part of this dissertation focuses on 
addressing this problem in RDVS cryptosystem.  
   
1.3. WORK SUMMARY  
This dissertation consists of three projects. 
The selective body biasing problem for post-silicon tuning in sub-threshold 
designs is proposed and solved with adaptive filtering algorithm in Section 2, in which, 
the selective body biasing problem is formulated mathematically as an integer 
programming problem with a statistical linear inequality constraint. In order to address 
this problem, the concept of adaptive filtering was borrowed from the signal processing 
community. A novel algorithm with binary attractors and power penalty was proposed to 
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efficiently solve it. The experiments were based on a set of industrial designs with a 65 
nm sub-threshold library. The pass rate is defined as the percentage of Monte Carlo 
samples without timing violations out of the 10K samples. Results show that, compared 
with a seemingly more intuitive approach, this approach can improve the pass rate by 
57% on average with similar standby power and the same number of body biasing gates. 
This approach can reduce the standby power on average by 84%, with a 20% pass rate 
loss as compared to the approach that biases all of the gates.  
Section 3 focuses on developing a more efficient algorithm to solve the proposed 
selective body biasing problem, which is formulated alternatively as a linear semi-infinite 
programming (LSIP) problem. In addition, the structure of the problem, associated with 
the physical meaning of the design, can lead to a novel Incremental Hypercubic Sampling 
(IHCS) algorithm. The algorithm solves the LSIP problem through a number of finite 
mixed-integer linear programming, and many nice properties of the algorithm are 
obtained through rigid mathematical derivations.  
Though RDVS technology is a very efficient method to improve the resistance of 
cryptosystem against SCA, it is demonstrated that the resistance can be undermined by 
providing lower off-chip power supply voltage in Section 4. In order to address this issue, 
the following method is proposed in this dissertation. The off-chip power supply voltage 
will be monitored, and an alarm could be triggered to protect valued information once the 
power supply voltage is lower than the expected voltage (threshold voltage). However, 
considering both maintenance cost and the environment noise on power supply voltage, 
this problem is formulated as a non-zero sum game model, and the attacker and the 
circuit supplier (defender) are the players of this game. The analysis of the Nash 
equilibrium in this game shed light on the choice of the optimal threshold voltage, which 
is based on parameters of cryptosystem including the value of information, denial-of-
service cost, etc. 
Finally, Section 5 discusses the contribution of this dissertation and suggestions 




2. PART 1: SELECTIVE BODY BIASING FOR POST-SILICON TUNING OF 
SUB-THRESHOLD DESIGNS: AN ADAPTIVE FILTERING 
2.1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Power consumption has become an important design consideration for modern 
circuits, which is particularly true for energy constrained applications (e.g., battery-
powered systems and wide-area surveillance) [1-4]. Sub-threshold designs (in which 
transistors work in a weak-inversion region under lower-than-threshold supply voltages) 
have emerged as a compelling solution for low power circuits and systems. The power 
consumption of sub-threshold circuits is expected to be within a range of 1pJ/instruction 
[4]. 
Despite significant power reductions, sub-threshold designs are subject to several 
challenges. The most critical challenge faced is related to predictability in the sub-
threshold regime, where the Vth variation is the dominant variation source. The threshold 
variation is typically induced by random dopant fluctuations (RDFs). The placement and 
number of dopant atoms in the device channel cause random shifts in Vth [3, 4]. The RDF 
may increase path delays dramatically given the exponential relationship between Vth and 
the drive current in the sub-threshold designs. Gate delay variations can be as high as 
300% of the nominal values [4]. Meanwhile, the Vth variation created by the RDF for 
each gate is purely random. Thus, the critical paths in different chips of the same design 
are likely to be completely different after the fabrication is complete. Therefore, 
obtaining a timing closure at the design time is extremely difficult. The post-silicon or 
runtime tuning techniques are imperative. 
Body biasing is one of the most effective tuning techniques currently available. 
This technique uses body effect to modulate the Vth of transistors, and thus changes the 
circuit’s power and performance. A total of three different types of body biasing 
technologies can be used: forward body biasing (FBB), reverse body biasing (RBB), and 
bidirectional adaptive body biasing (ABB). Forward body biasing is typically used to 
speed up the circuit during the active mode. RBB is an effective technique that can be 
used to decrease the leakage power in standby mode. Finally, adaptive body biasing can 
be adjusted into either FBB or RBB at the cost of control and measurement circuitry [7]. 
However, many existing works on body biasing assumed super-threshold designs either 
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explicitly or implicitly [7-11] [27-29], and they cannot be extended directly to the sub-
threshold regime, primarily as a result of the exponential dependency of delay on the 
purely random Vth variation. The details are discussed in Section II. 
Bo Zhai [4] derived a statistical model of the sub-threshold circuit delay and 
proposed the reduction of energy consumption by optimizing the pipeline’s depth. 
However, it assumes that path delays are independent random variables with lognormal 
distributions, and that the maximum of two lognormal random variables is still 
lognormal. Although the gate delays are independent, the path delays are possibly 
dependent because different paths may share gates.  
Bo Liu, etc. in [6] were the first to examine the possibility of body biasing in sub-
threshold designs. They suggested that both gate resizing and a fuzzy logic controller 
could be used to reduce the effect of process variation. However, the additional fuzzy 
logic controller involves extra dynamic power. In addition, in that approach body biasing 
is applied to all of the gates. That introduces large power and area overhead. 
Nearly all of the body biasing studies conducted [6-11] assumed the presence of 
multiple body biasing voltage domains. These domains increase not only the routing but 
also the control complexity, which makes these schemes hard to be employed in large-
volume commercial production. Multiple body biasing schemes also suffer from less 
latch-up immunity, less threshold voltage controllability, more substrate noise 
vulnerability and less gate oxide reliability. Considering the relative importance of 
reliability and cost, it is more practical to explore a scheme that uses only one body 
biasing voltage domain, preferably with binary control decision, i.e., whether a single 
body biasing voltage should be applied or not.   
Towards this end, this dissertation puts forward a novel body biasing scheme for 
sub-threshold designs which tries to find a number of selective gates for body biasing so 
that the timing violation caused by random Vth variation is eliminated statistically with 
minimum standby power overhead. This scheme applies the same FBB voltage to all of 
the selected transistors so that the design cost can be reduced. The proposed algorithm is 
an offline algorithm, which selects the set of gates for body biasing at design-time. 
During post-silicon tuning, the biasing voltage is simply applied to the gates selected.  
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Simply assuming the worst case for all the gates will not be an option here, as the 
timing benefit brought by body biasing for a single gate in the sub-threshold regime can 
barely cancel its own delay increment in the worst-case scenario. Accordingly, for worst-
case scenario, all the gates have to be selected as body biasing gates. On the other hand, 
the probability that all the gates are in the worst-case corner at the same time is extremely 
low. It is thus meaningful to explore an alternative statistical solution.     
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Both the background and 
motivation behind this study are summarized in Section 2.2. The timing model and 
problem formulation are introduced in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents the proposed 
adaptive filtering algorithm. Experimental results are presented in Section 2.5 and 
concluding remarks are given in Section 2.6. 
 
2.2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
The biggest challenge in sub-threshold designs is the unpredictability brought by 
the exponential dependence of delay variation on purely random threshold voltage 
variations. 
A 65 nm industrial sub-threshold design was used as an example to illustrate this 
challenge. The normalized path delay, without variation, is given in Figure 2.1 (a). This 
design was processed through timing optimization, and the critical path ID was 5436. 
Meanwhile, 10K Monte Carlo simulations were run for σ/μ = 10% Vth variation. The 
percentage that each path can become critical was calculated as in Figure 2.1 (b).  
The highest possibility at which a path can become critical is approximately 
1.46%, which means that many other paths may become critical. Accordingly, it is no 
longer possible to design for timing closure based on a selected number of critical paths, 
and post-silicon tuning is imperative to address the problem. 
A number of researchers have proposed the use of body biasing for post-silicon 
tuning, but for super-threshold designs [7-11] [27-29]. Most used ABB technology, 
which can improve the performance of slow modules to fix the timing problem. It can 
also reduce the leakage power of fast modules. Additional circuitry is, however, needed 







Figure 2.1. Normalized path delay and critical path distribution: (a) normalized path 
delay without Vth variation,  and (b) critical path distribution with Vth variation in a 65 












































A test chip with an on-chip body biasing generator was implemented to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of bidirectional ABB [7]. Critical paths were replicated as 
part of an ABB control circuit to generate one or multiply body biasing voltages. 
However, it assumes that a small set of critical paths can be identified. This assumption is 
incorrect for sub-threshold designs, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
A lookup table based ABB scheme was proposed to control multiple functional 
blocks on a single chip independently. Different body biasing voltages were stored in a 
look-up table. Sensors were used to detect the temperature variation, and then suitable 
body biasing voltages were obtained for corresponding blocks [10]. One disadvantage 
associated with this method is the significant area overhead of additional circuitry. 
Another is the large number of delay and leakage measurements required to obtain the 
final solution. Though the authors tried to decrease the requirement of delay and leakage 
samples by using a polynomial timing model, it only worked for super-threshold designs 
and could not be extended to the sub-threshold region. 
A joint co-optimization workflow was proposed to minimize the leakage power, 
under a given delay constraint, at a given yield in [27]. It included design-time gate-level 
sizing and post-silicon ABB adaptation. A robust adjustable linear program algorithm 
was given to solve the problem. Extending this solution to a sub-threshold design is 
difficult, because this optimization problem requires a linearized delay model (which is 
difficult to obtain in the sub-threshold region). In contrast, for multiple optimal body 
biasing voltages, additional body biasing voltage generators are required to implement 
the biasing voltages. This not only further increases the area overhead to the body biasing 
gate area and routing cost, but also suffers from less latch-up immunity, less threshold 
voltage controllability, more vulnerable to substrate noise and less gate oxide reliability.                 
One of the most common problems associated with ABB is the large area 
overhead when body biasing is provided to all of the gates. Considering multiple body 
biasing voltages are needed in ABB, almost all the ABB related papers use clustering 
methods to solve this problem. However, most cluster technologies are based on blocks 
that utilize the spatial correlation of process parameters. [9] [28] proposed the use of 
variability-aware technique to cluster gates using distributions and correlations of gate 
delays. This technique assumes that the relationship between the delay and the variation 
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source is linear. It also assumes that the variations at different gates are spatially 
correlated. Neither of these, however, hold true in sub-threshold designs. 
Several researchers have tried to provide body biasing to part of gates to decrease 
area overhead. [8] tried to minimize the standby power by selecting a subset of rows from 
a row-based standard cell layout. Body biasing was applied to those selected rows that 
contained the most timing critical gates. The timing constraints, however, were 
deterministic. This does not fit the strong log-normal random variations in sub-threshold 
designs.  
To sum up, most of the previous papers on body biasing only work for super-
threshold. They either assume a small set of critical paths, or utilize a linearized delay 
model and spatially variation information which do not hold in sub-threshold designs. 
Meanwhile, there exists huge routing area and standby power overhead for multiple body 
biasing voltages which prohibits them from being used in practical industrial application.  
In order to address the above issues, this paper proposes to only apply one post-
silicon body biasing voltage to a limited number of selected gates in order to optimize the 
standby power overhead. Both the reduced routing area cost and improved reliability are 
preferable in practice, because only one body biasing voltage is utilized. 
 
2.3. MODELING AND PROBLEM FORMULATION 
As mentioned in the introduction section, in order to reduce as much standby 
power overhead as possible for sub-threshold designs, a minimal set of gates needs to be 
identified. Thus, the timing violations can be statistically eliminated by providing body 
biasing to this set. The following is divided into three subsections. The timing model is 
defined in the first section, and the problem is formulated mathematically in the second. 
The third subsection contains an example that illustrates this formulation. 
2.3.1. Models and Assumptions.  As will be shown later, a large number of delay 
samples under the random Vth variation is needed to train the adaptive algorithm to be 
proposed. The time-consuming Monte Carlo simulation is not a viable option here. An 
analytic delay model that is less accurate but much more efficient is thus used. 

















t C V e e e
I
       (2.1) 
where    is the delay factor and  sC  is the switching load capacitance. ddV   is the supply 
voltage and Vth is the threshold voltage. TV   is the thermal voltage and   is the sub¬-
threshold swing parameter. The constant   can be obtained by using HSPICE to measure 
the gate delay at typical Vth.   
 In addition, the threshold with body biasing can be calculated based on the 
equation 
 0 ( | 2 | | 2 |),     th th s SB sV V V     (2.2) 
where   (the body biasing coefficient) and s   (the surface potential) are obtained from 
the technology library [12].  SBV   is the body biasing voltage, and 0thV   (the threshold 
voltage for  0SBV ) is a random variable due to the process variation. 
 The following assumptions are also made to hold for sub-threshold designs: 
 The routing of body biasing nets has a minimal impact on signal nets, and thus, 
signal net’s wire delay remains constant. 
 Most of paths in the sub-threshold design can become critical paths. This is due to 
purely random Vth variation and the exponential relationship between delay and 
Vth variation. The example given in Section 2.2 (Figure 2.1 (b)) was used to 
demonstrate this assumption. 
 Only one body-biasing domain will be used (i.e., all of the gates selected for body 
biasing will use the same body voltage, and only one user-specified biasing 
voltage is available). This assumption is made to significantly reduce the 
hardware cost associated with body biasing. 
The last two assumptions make this work unique. The system to be identified is 
sparse (considering a very limited number of gates) and binary; there are only two 
controlling options for each gate: using body biasing or not. This permits the formulation 
of the problem in a very interesting way as given below. 
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2.3.2. Problem Formulation.  Without loss of generality, only combinational 
logic is considered in the following discussion, because for sequential logic, the 
combinational logic can be checked between each pair of the registers separately. 
For a design with a total of N gates and M paths, a matrix A  with M rows and N 
columns is defined to represent the circuit connection in which each row stands for a path 
and each column stands for a gate. If a gate Gn appears in path Pm, the element at m-th 
row and n-th column of the matrix A (i.e. m,nA  ) will be set to 1, otherwise it is set to 0. 
Three N×1   vectors are defined as t  , t'  , and t''  , in which each element stands for a 
gate’s t  ,  t'  and  t''  delay in different scenarios: 
 t  is the gate delay without Vth variation or body biasing, 
 t'  is the gate delay with only Vth variation,. 
 t''  is the gate delay with both Vth variation and body biasing. 
 Thus,  t  is the ideal gate delay with no process variation and t'   is the gate delay 
sample with random normal distributed Vth variation that may cause timing violations. In 
theory, since Vth could deviate from its nominal value in each direction,  t'  may be either 
longer or smaller than t . In order to address the possible timing violation, some gates will 
be selected for body biasing, and their gate delay after body biasing is t'' . 
 With the definitions above, when there are no variations or body biasing, the 
maximum delay,  T  for this circuit could be obtained by 
  max . AtT   (2.3) 
 The circuit is assumed to have passed the timing sign-off when there is no process 
variation. Accordingly, this delay T  will be taken as the target of the post-silicon body 
biasing tuning. The delay matrix t'A   ( M N ) when there is Vth variation can be 
calculated as 
  ' ' ,A A tt diag   (2.4) 
where  'tdiag   is a N N  diagonal matrix with diagonal vector t' . Similarly, the delay 
matrix ''At  ( M N ) when there are both Vth variation and body biasing is 
  '' '' .A A tt diag   (2.5) 
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 Therefore, when body biasing is applied, the delay improvement matrix 'Att   
( M N ) is 
  ' ' '' ' '' .   A A A A t ttt t t diag   (2.6) 
 The overall required delay improvement vector b  ( 1M ) required to fulfill the 
target delay is 
 ' , b At IMT   (2.7) 
where  IM  is a unit vector ( 1M ) . 
 A decision vector x  ( 1N ) is defined, in which each element represents the 
decision of body biasing control on that gate, i.e., 1 means applying body biasing to that 
gate and 0 means no body biasing. The proper x  must be chosen to ensure the overall 
delay improvement for every path is larger than the required delay improvement, thereby 
fulfilling the timing constraint, 
  'prob >1- ,A x b  tt    (2.8) 
where   is a small positive number and ' A x b  tt  represents a component-wise 
inequality (i.e., 
, ' , 1... a x  m tt mb m M , where , 'am tt  is the 
thm  row of 'Att , and mb  is the 
thm  element of b ).  
When the delay is modelled in a statistical way, this is a robust linear 
programming problem which could be considered in a statistical framework [15]. 
However, due to the fact that the delay is log-normal and the paths are not independent 
with each other, it is not tractable since the joint distribution is very difficult to obtain. 
Therefore, the approach in [15] cannot be used, and (2.8) can be further converted to a 
minimization problem using the logarithmic barrier function and solve it using adaptive 
filtering based algorithm later in Section 2.3. 
 Additional two 1 N  vectors are defined as p , and pb , in which each element 
stands for Gn gate’s power np  without body biasing, and power ,b np  with body biasing. 








= p x + p I x




  (2.9) 
where IN  is a unit vector ( N×1).  





              









  (2.10) 
where  p p xb  is used as the optimization target. Considering that pIN  is constant, it is 
the same as   pI p p xN b . It should be noted that the integer set in (2.10) is non-
convex and the coefficients of the constraint are statistical. Accordingly, the problem is 
NP hard. A novel adaptive filtering algorithm will be proposed to solve it below. Before 
that, an example to illustrate the above modeling process is first given in sub-section 
2.2.3 as below. 
2.3.3. An Example.  Taking the circuit T0 as an example, there are a total of six 
2-input NAND gates identified by number G1 - G6 respectively in network T0, shown in 
Figure 2.2. There are 11 paths in total. If the same worst-case gate delay is used for any 
path going through a gate (regardless of the input pin difference), the path number can be 
further reduced to 7, as shown in Table 2.1.   
 
 



















Table 2.1 Paths of T0. 










 According to TABLE I, the matrix A of T0 is 
 
1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 0 1
.0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1












A   (2.11) 
 And the t  vector ( 6 1 ) can be express as 
 1 2 3 4 5 6[ ] ,t
T
t t t t t t   (2.12) 
where nt  ( 1,2,...,6n ) is the gate delay without process variation or body biasing for 




2 3 5 2 3 6 2 4 6
max
max{ , , }.

      
AtT
t t t t t t t t t
  (2.13) 
 The t'  and t''  vector could be obtained similarly,  in which '
nt  and  
''
nt   means the 
't  delay with process variation only and ''t  the delay with both process variation and 
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body biasing for gate number n . The delay improvement matrix 'Att  ( 7 6 ) of T0 can 
then be expressed as 
 
1 1 5 5
2 2 3 3 5 5
2 2 3 3 6 6
2 2 4 4 6 6
3 3 5 5
3 3 7 7
4 4 7 7
' '' 0 0 0 ' '' 0
0 ' '' ' '' 0 ' '' 0
0 ' '' ' '' 0 0 ' ''
0 ' '' 0 ' '' 0 ' '' .
0 0 ' '' 0 ' '' 0
0 0 ' '' 0 0 ' ''
0 0 0 ' '' 0 ' ''
  
   
 
   
 




   
t t t t
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
t t t t
t t t t
t t t t
  (2.14) 
 Then the required delay improvement vector b  ( 7 1 ) is 
 
1 5 2 3 5 2 3 6
2 4 6 3 5 3 6 4 6
[ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ] .
        
        
b
T
t t T t t t T t t t T
t t t T t t T t t T t t T
  (2.15) 
 Note that both 't  and ''t  for each gate are independent lognormal random 
variables since the Vth variations follow independent Gaussian distributions. 
 
2.4. ALGORITHM 
In this section, a novel adaptive filtering based framework is proposed to solve the 
problem formulated in (2.10), along with its complexity analysis. The framework 
overview is illustrated in Figure 2.3, which includes three steps: data pre-processing, 
representative path selection, and APA-BA-PP.   
The pre-processing step is based on the gate level Verilog file. Both path and gate 
information are extracted first. The sub-threshold timing model is then built through 
HSPICE simulation. The matrices and vectors are prepared last as described in Section 
2.2. 
A representative path selection stage is employed because the path number can 
have an exponential relationship with the gate number. It selects a set of representative 
paths, the number of which does not exceed the number of gates. The details are 
described in Section 2.3.1.  
Finally, the APA-BA-PP algorithm actually selects the gates for body biasing and 





Figure 2.3. Adaptive filitering framework overview 
 
 
2.4.1. Representative Path Selection.  This step suppresses the potentially huge 
path number. A similar approach as described in [14] [26] is employed. To illustrate the 
idea, circuit T0 is used again as an example. Its 7 paths are expressed in the graph in 
Figure 2.4. Based on this graph, the delay of path P2: G2→G3→G5 and P4: 
G2→G4→G6 can be rewritten accurately as the linear combination of the remaining 




Figure 2.4. Network of T0. 
 
 
In general, the representative path selection algorithm can find r paths, the linear 
combination of which can represent the delay of other paths. This will reduce the 











column number which in turn is equal to the gate number, the number of representative 
paths selected will not exceed the gate number. The details are as follows.   
To select these representative paths, singular value decomposition (SVD) is 
performed on matrix A firstly, 
 ,A U VT   (2.16) 
and then apply QR decomposition using column pivoting on Ur , which is a sub-matrix 
formed by the first r  columns of U  
 .U P QRTr r   (2.17) 
The matrices Q  and R  are found during the procedure and help identify the 




  is computed and the sub-matrix formed by the first r  rows is taken as Ar  which 
in turn corresponds to r  paths. 
It should be noted that considering the delay is modelled as log-normal 
distribution, it is not guaranteed that the other non-presentative paths can also satisfy the 
timing constraints. Even for the representative paths, it is not guaranteed that they can 
satisfy the delay constraints for every possible sample of the log-normal distributions. 
However, the use of representative paths is still helpful to conquer the complexity issue 
and to highlight the essential circuit structure information.  
The SVD and QR decomposition in this algorithm are only a one-time cost for 
each design. Sophisticated algorithms are available for solving these procedures. 
Furthermore, because matrix A  is very sparse, the runtime of SVD could be further 
reduced through exploiting this sparsity. The analysis of the computation complexity will 
be detailed in Section 2.3.3.  
2.4.2. APA-BA-PP Algorithm.  After reducing A  to Ar , the formulation in 
(2.10) can be simplified as: 
                          p p xmin b   (2.18) 




                       0,1 ,





  (2.20) 
The formulated problem in (2.18)-(2.20) contains three parts: the inequality 
timing requirement (2.19), the integer set constraint (2.20) and the minimization target of 
power cost (2.18). In this subsection, a novel algorithm is proposed to solve this problem: 
the inequality timing constraint (2.19) is first transformed to a logarithmic barrier 
optimization target; the power minimization target (2.18) is then added in the cost 
function as power penalty, and the integer set constraint (2.20) converted as the binary 
attractor in the cost function. The details will be elaborated below.  
At first, in order to handle the inequality constraint, the logarithmic barrier 
function [14] is utilized to convert the inequality constraint to the following 
unconstrained optimization 
  m, '
1
       -log .






b   (2.21) 
This problem is still challenging as the coefficients are all statistical. Towards 
this, the adaptive filtering concept could be borrowed from the signal processing 
community to aid in developing a novel algorithm to solve it. 
Considering that the delay improvement matrix 'Att  and the required delay 
improvement vector b  are all lognormal distributions, following the way [15] handles the 
impulse noise, a constraint on the update of the adaptive filter coefficients is added: 
 
      
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k k b k
k k 
  (2.22) 
where k is the sampling time index for the different random lognormal distributions, and 
  is a parameter ensuring that ( )x k  and ( 1)x k -  does not change dramatically. This can 
also be viewed as the minimum disturbance constraint.  The variable   controls the 
convergence level of the algorithm and it should be as small as possible. The a-posterior 
error is 
        , ' , 1... .  a x  
T
m m m ttk b k k k m r   (2.23) 
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Considering that the optimization target in (2.22) is convex, the method of 
Lagrange multipliers could be used, and the unconstrained cost function of (2.22) can be 
obtained as 
 
     



















  (2.24) 
where   is the Lagrange multiplier. The derivative of the cost function with respect to 































  (2.25) 
Setting the derivative to zero, (2.26) is gotten as 























  (2.26) 
Substituting (2.26) into the constraint (2.22), (2.27) is obtained 
 
  




















  (2.27) 






k  can be canceled, and the 
update equation for the x  vector is: 
    
 
   
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' '
1 .  
A I
x x









  (2.28) 
In practice, a small positive regularization parameter   is added in the 
denominator of the second term to prevent the divide-by-zero problem. The update 
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  (2.29) 
Next, consider the integer constraint, which is non-convex and NP hard. In order 
to conquer the NP-hard integer set problem, the idea of the zero-point attractor in [16] is 
extended to a binary attractor. First, the concept of the 0l   norm, that counts the number 
of non-zero entries, is introduced.  
Considering that 0l  norm is a Non-Polynomial (NP) hard problem, it is generally 
approximated by a continuous function. A popular approximation [17] is 











  (2.30) 
where the two sides of (2.30) are strictly equal when the parameter   approaches 
infinity. Here, it is extended to involve both 0 and 1 as below 
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  (2.31) 
To illustrate how (2.31) works, the function  




x k x k
e e
 
 is plotted in 
Figure 2.5. It is clear that it outputs 1 if the input is neither 0 nor 1, which is also the 
number of non-zero and none-one entries. The motivation behind the binary attractor is 
that the following target 
  
0,1
       xmin k   (2.32) 
minimizes the total number of non-zero and non-one entries, which requires the optimal 
solution to belong to the  0,1  integer space. Considering the power minimization target 
too, the proposed cost function in (2.21) can be rewritten as 
 
      
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k k b k
k k 
  (2.33) 
where    1 p p xb k  is the power penalty term, 0  is a step-size factor of the 




Figure 2.5 The continuous approximated function of the new l0,1 norm counting both 
non-zero and non-one entries, which outputs 1 when the input is neither 0 nor 1. 
 
 
Therefore, by minimizing (2.33), the update of the adaptive filtering should be 
modified to: 
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 x k  is the gradient with respect to  x k . Note that the current form of 
(2.34) cannot be implemented in practice, since the term depends on  x k , the exact a 
priori value of which is not known. Since the additional constraint 
   
2 2
2
1  x xk k   is applied in (2.22), it is reasonable to assume 
   
0,1 0,1
1 x xk k ,    
0,1 0,1
1  x xk k . Therefore, the update of the adaptive 
filtering should be modified to: 
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  (2.35) 
 
Substituting (2.31) into (2.35), the final update of the adaptive filtering is: 
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  (2.36) 
where   is the component-wise multiplication, I  is a unit vector, and  sgn   is 















  (2.37) 
 
The algorithm described by (2.36) is denoted as affine projection algorithm with 
binary attractor and power penalty (APA-BA-PP). The final algorithm is shown in 
Algorithm 1. 
The interpretation of the proposed adaptive algorithm is presented as follows. The 
adaptive filtering algorithm sequentially updates its filter coefficients along the negative 













Algorithm 1: APA-BA-PP 
a. Initialization: 
0 0 0, , , ,       
 
0 0,0,.0 .. 0, , x
T
k   
b. Load  A, p, pb and   Ar rank  
c. Perform SVD decomposition on A U VT   
d. Perform QR with column pivoting on matrix Ur  composed 
by the first r  columns of  U . U P QRTr r , where Pr  is 
permutation matrix.  




f. Calculate delay t   and   max AtT  
g. Loop: while k K  
h.    Calculate random delay 't  and ''t , and 
                








   
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A A t A A t
A A A A t t
b A t I
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      i.    Calculate step-size 
              1 1 1, ,    k k k k k k       
 j.    Update the filter 















































         k.   1 k k  
 
 
For the first term of gradient correction, according to the definition of matrix 'Att ,  
 'A I
T
tt k  is the summation of delay improvement of each gate over all the representative 
paths at timing index k, and after normalization, this information is used to select the 
gate. At each iteration, the algorithm adopts the body biasing assignment according to a 
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single case of variation. Different samples in subsequent iterations may cause the 
assignment solution to move in different directions, and a move in one iteration may 
deteriorate the timing yield of previous samples. However the assignment solution will 
move towards the direction that moderates most of the variations, in the long run. It is 
reasonable that the gates with accumulated higher overall delay improvement over 
different samples of the random distribution tend to be critical and this works in a similar 
way of sorting the gates based on their statistical summations of delay improvement 
contribution.   
The second term, power penalty, is a constant negative vector based on the extra 
power cost for each gate if it is selected to apply body bias. This power penalty is used to 
suppress the gates with higher power cost to be selected.  
Finally, the third term, binary attraction, imposes an attraction to zero and one on 
the coefficients near zero and one. To further illustrate the impact of the binary attractor, 
it is plotted in Figure 2.6. After each iteration, a filter weight will increase a little when it 
is less than zero, or decrease a little when it is larger than zero. Meanwhile, the filter 
weight less than one will increase a little and decrease a little if larger than one. 
Therefore, the binary attractor will attract the non-zero and non-one weights around zero 
and one. The range of attraction depends on the parameter  . In the adaptation, the gate 
with lower delay improvement contribution (near zero) in the past indicates a higher 
possibility of remaining not selected, and the one with higher contribution (near one) 
tends to remain selected.  According to Figure 2.6., the closer it is to zero and one, the 
greater the attraction intensity is. In conclusion, the binary attractor could smooth and 
remove the effect of abrupt delay variation due to exponential delay relationship. 
According to the above analysis, it is clear that the step-size    and   determine 
the performance of the proposed algorithm. In order to further improve the performance, 
a simple variable step-size strategy is used in which the step-sizes are reduced by a 
constant factor [18]. This is because when more and more samples are accumulated in the 
sorting, the resulting rank should become more stable, therefore the power penalty and 
binary attractor can gradually be removed. More complicated variable step-size algorithm 




Figure 2.6 The plot of the binary attractor, which is the negative gradient direction of new 
l0,1 norm, imposes an attraction to zero and one on the coefficients near zero and one. 
 
 
is a user-specified number. The larger K is, the more gates will be selected, the impact of 
K on the pass rate and gate selection will be shown later.  
To sum up, the proposed APA-BA-PP algorithm can sort the gates based on their 
statistical contributions to overall delay improvement considering both the standby power 
cost and the binary decision rule. In practice, in order to further regulate the right-hand 
side of (2.36), a sigmoidal function could be applied [25], and the final gate set should be 
selected according to the final ranking of the solution based on the balance between the 
pass rate requirement and the tolerance of standby power. However, it should be noted 
that the rigid convergence analysis of the proposed algorithm is still open for future work. 
In practice, the algorithm could be enforced to stop after a maximum number of iterations 
K  are achieved (in experiments of this dissertation K = 5000 ). Experimental results 
show that such a heuristic can provide solutions with reasonably good quality. 


























2.4.3. Complexity Analysis. This section is concluded with the complexity 
analysis of this APA-BA-PP algorithm. SVD decomposition is done to path matrix A  (
M N ), where M  is the number of paths and N  is the number of gates. This APA-BA-
PP algorithm deals with the combinational circuits between registers, similarly to those in 
the timing analysis. For modern designs with millions of gates, the number of gates 
would still be in the range of thousands.  
For most designs, A  is usually very sparse. Therefore, this sparse property can be 
utilized to significantly decrease the runtime of SVD. For example, the randomized SVD 
[30] [33] runs very fast on large scale sparse matrix. According to reference [30], the 
complexity of randomized schemes SVD could achieve  O MNlog(r) , where r is number 
of representative paths, which ideally should be the rank of the matrix A . For extremely 
large number of paths, the runtime could be further decreased through using smaller r 
than the real rank of A at the cost of slight accuracy loss, as will be shown in the 
experimental results. 
The complexity of QR with column pivoting on matrix Ur  with size M r  is
 2 , 1fO (M +rlog (r))r f  [31], which is also linear w.r.t. the path number. Yet 
compared with SVD decomposition, it is well known that QR has a much smaller affine. 
Therefore, the runtime of QR is also acceptable. 
Finally, for the proposed APA-BA-PP algorithm, matrix operations are involved 
with complexity  O Nr   in each iteration. Accordingly, the total complexity is  O KNr , 
where K is the total iteration number.  
 
2.5. EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
The path extraction was implemented in Python and the remaining parts were 
implemented in C++. Eigen 3.0 library was used for the QR decomposition [18], and 
redsvd package was used for SVD [19]. Simulations are performed based on five 65 nm 
industrial sub-threshold designs as listed in Table 2.2, which includes the path number, 
gate number along with the rank of matrix A  (the number of representative paths) for 
each design.  The supply voltage is 200 mV, and the body biasing voltage VBS is set to -
400 mV for PMOS and 400 mV for NMOS. The body biasing voltage is selected so that 
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when all the gates are biased, 100% pass rate can be achieved for Vth variance less than 
8%. All pass rates reported in this section were obtained through 10K Monte Carlo 
simulations. In each simulation, it works only if all the paths satisfy the target delay, 
otherwise it fails. The pass rate is the ratio of the number of working simulations to the 
total number of simulations. The experiments were conducted on a workstation equipped 
with quad-core 2.4 GHz CPU and 96 GB RAM.  
The proposed adaptive algorithm is compared with two intuitive methods. The 
first one “all body biasing” applies body biasing to all the gates in the design. The second 
one “weighted delay” selects body biasing gates based on the descending order of the 
weighted delay of each gate. The weighted delay of a gate is defined as the product of the 
number of paths going through a gate and its corresponding delay improvement when 
body biasing is applied. This metric evaluates the overall importance of a gate in timing. 
For a fair comparison, the same number of gates are selected for the weighted delay 
method and the proposed adaptive filtering method. 
 







T1 168 75,383 122 
T2 496 5830 248 
T3 546 916,719 311 
T4 892 729,045 460 
T5 1,269 462,140 379 
T6 3,513 685,908 - 
 
 
The pass rate and standby power are compared among the three methods in the six 
designs for different Vth variations (σ/μ), and the results are shown in Table 2.3. Different 
Vth variations are used to report meaningful pass rates as the designs are of different 
sizes. For the adaptive filtering method and the weighted delay method, the percentage of 
gates selected for body biasing is also reported. The number of iterations used in the 
adaptive filtering method is between 5,000 and 6,000. According to the results in this 
table, compared with the all body biasing method which always achieves 100% pass rate , 
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the adaptive filtering method reduces the standby power by 86% at the cost of 20% pass 
rate loss on average. On the other hand, compared with the weighted delay method, the 
adaptive filtering method increases the pass rate by up to 57% with the similar standby 
power. Also, the number of gates selected for body biasing only constitutes a small 
percentage of the total gates, which verifies the sparsity assumption in Section 2.4.     
Design T2 is then used to study the relationship between pass rate and Vth 
variation for the three methods shown in Figure 2.7. The adaptive filtering approach is 
stopped after 6,000 iterations. 97 out of 496 gates are selected by the adaptive filtering 
approach and the weighted delay approach. As expected, the proposed adaptive filtering 
method outperforms the weighted delay method significantly. But it is worse compared 
with the all body biasing method, which is the cost paid to achieve the significant standby 
power reduction. Note that the performance difference between APA-BA-PP and “All 
body bias” can be further reduced by choosing more selected gates as studied later in 
Figure 2.8. 
 
Table 2.3 Comparison of pass rate among different approach 
Design 


















T1 0.04 100% 0% 80% 0.35 0.09 0.10 25.60% 
T2 0.03 100% 8% 70% 0.86 0.17 0.15 18.71% 
T3 0.06 100% 11% 78% 1.08 0.24 0.23 19.60% 
T4 0.04 100% 10% 96% 1.70 0.31 0.30 17.26% 
T5 0.07 100% 56% 84% 2.25 0.27 0.27 10.87% 










Figure 2.8 Pass rate and the percentage of gates selected v.s. iteration number for design 
T2 with 10% Vth variance 
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The same design is used again to demonstrate the relationship between the pass 
rate/percentage of the total gates selected and the iteration number for the adaptive 
filtering method. The results are depicted in Figure 2.8 for 10% Vth variance. As 
mentioned earlier, the selected gate number will increase in each iteration to achieve 
higher pass rate. This can be clearly observed in the figure. Interestingly, when the 
iteration number increases over 6,000, a sharp increase in pass rate can be observed. 
Therefore, it is necessary to try different numbers of iterations, and choose the most cost-
efficient size for the target gate set. 
Still using the same design, the impact from the representative path selection step 
is studied. The pass rates from the adaptive filtering method with and without this step 
are compared for different Vth variance, and the results are shown in Figure 2.9. From the 
figure it can be seen that using representative paths can result in slightly lower pass rate 
for the same Vth variation. But it results in drastic runtime reduction by reducing the 
exponential path number to linear w.r.t. the gate number. 
As mentioned in Section 2.3.3, the proposed algorithm deals with the 
combinational circuits between registers, and for modern designs with millions of gates, 
the number of gates will be in the range of thousands. In order to demonstrate the 
scalability of the proposed scheme, the runtime of SVD, QR and APA-BA-PP are 
separately reported for different cases in Table 2.4. It verifies that even for the largest 
design T6 with 3,513 gates, the runtime is still acceptable. 
Meanwhile, the impact of the number of representative paths r on the runtime and 
the quality of the solution is very interesting. T5 is used here as an example, and the 
runtimes of SVD and QR w.r.t. different r are shown in Figure 2.10. It is clear that the 
runtime could be significantly decreased with smaller r. On the other hand, the impact of 
r on pass rate  is presented in Figure 2.11, which verifies that the pass rate loss could be 
slight for r reduced from 379 (full rank) to 127 (10% of the gate number). 
Finally, using Cadence encounter, the core layout of T2 is finished to study the 
area overhead of the proposed algorithm.   The layout without body biasing is given in 
Figure 2.12, and layout with selected body biasing is compared in Figure 2.13. Based on 
the proposed APA-BA-PP, 97 out of 496 gates are selected in T2, and the total area 
overhead is 0.8% compared with the original design without body biasing, which is really 
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small (the size is labeled in the layout). Considering that the area overhead is from both 
biasing gates and routing, the wire length overhead is also given to show the contribution 
of different parts. The total wire length is 3,387 um for the design without body biasing, 
and 3,447 um for the design with body biasing, a 2% overhead. 
 
Figure 2.9 The impact of representative path selection on pass rate at different Vth 
variance for design T2. 
 
 








T1 122 0.91 0.58 7.23 
T2 248 0.34 0.15 17.72 
T3 311 65.37 40.28 34.99 
T4 460 111.72 63.35 47.01 
T5 254 21.18 13.19 75.04 
T6 702 228.05 129.52 140.01 
 
 





























Figure 2.10 The impact of r on runtime for design T5. 
 
 
Figure 2.11 The impact of r on pass rate for design T5. 
 
 






































































2.6. CONCLUSION  
In this project, the problem of body biasing for sub-threshold designs with one 
body biasing voltage domain and one body biasing voltage level is formulated firstly. It is 
demonstrated that the problem can be modeled as a linearly constrained statistical sparse 
optimization problem, and the adaptive filtering concept from the signal processing 
community is borrowed to develop an efficient algorithm to solve it. Experimental results 
on industrial designs using 65nm sub-threshold library suggest that compared with the 
weighted delay approach, the proposed approach can improve the pass rate by 57% on 
average with similar standby power and the same number of body biasing gates. 
Compared with the approach to bias all the gates, the proposed approach can reduce the 







3. PART I: SELECTIVE BODY BIASING FOR POST-SILICON TUNING OF 
SUB-THRESHOLD DESIGNS: A SEMI-INFINITE PROGRAMMING 
APPROACH WITH INCREMENTAL HYPERCUBIC SAMPLING 
3.1. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
A practical selective body biasing scheme, with only one body biasing voltage 
domain to fix the timing violation, is proposed in Section 2. However, though the 
formulated problem used uncertain constraints with probability distribution, the proposed 
adaptive algorithm does not explicitly prioritize the constraints with larger probability 
(i.e., constraints that are more likely to occur). In addition, the power optimization was 
achieved with power penalty heuristic, and the integer constraints in the formulation were 
conquered by the binary attractor heuristic. These heuristics lack theoretical justification 
and have no guaranteed convergence rate. All these issues will significantly degrade the 
performance of the algorithm. 
The interesting fact is noticed that the problem of selective body biasing with 
single biasing voltage domain can be formulated alternatively as a linear semi-infinite 
programming (LSIP) problem. In addition, the structure of the problem, associated with 
the physical meaning of the design, can lead to a novel Incremental Hypercubic Sampling 
(IHCS) algorithm. The algorithm solves the LSIP problem through a number of finite 
mixed-integer linear programming. Finally, many nice properties of the algorithm is 
demonstrated through rigid mathematical derivations. Experimental results on industrial 
designs using 65nm sub-threshold library demonstrate that, compared with the state-of-
art adaptive filtering approach in Section 2, the IHCS approach can improve the pass rate 
by up to 7.3x with a speed up to 4.1x, using the same number of body biasing gates with 
about the same power consumption. 
The remainder of this section is organized as follows: Section 3.2 gives the new 
LSIP problem formulation. The proposed IHCS algorithm is presented in Section 3.3. 
The experimental results are demonstrated in Section 3.4 and concluding remarks are 
given in Section 3.5. 
 
3.2. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
In this section, an alternative formulation for the problem of selective body biasi- 
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-ng with only one biasing voltage domain is shown, which will lead to a novel and 
efficient algorithm. 
This section is started by defining the notations necessary for the discussion. 
Following the delay model in Section 2, all gates are simplified as a simple pull-up or 
pull-down transistor or appropriate driving strength, and only the worst case falling and 
rising time is considered. The gate delay is given here again in the following (3.1) for 
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       (3.1) 
where    is the delay factor and  sC  is the switching load capacitance. ddV   is the supply 
voltage and Vth is the threshold voltage. TV   is the thermal voltage and   is the sub-
threshold swing parameter. The constant   can be obtained by using HSPICE to measure 
the gate delay at typical Vth.   
 The threshold with body biasing can be calculated as 
 0 ( | 2 | | 2 |),     th th s SB sV V V     (3.2) 
where both   (the body biasing coefficient) and s   (the surface potential) are obtained 
from the technology library [12]. SBV  is the body biasing voltage, and 0thV   (the threshold 
voltage for  0SBV ) is a random variable due to the process variation. 
The gate threshold voltage vector Vth is defined as  1 2, , ,th th thNV V V , which is 
multivariate Gaussian random vector. The threshold voltage mean value is defined as 
Vth01N, where  1N  is  1N  vector of all ones. 
The delay improvement matrix 'Att  is formulated as  
  ' ' '' . A A t ttt diag   (3.3) 
where matrix A  with M rows and N columns is used to represent the connection 
information of design. Each row represents a path, and each column represents a gate. If 
n-th gate appears in m-th path, the element at the m-th row and n-th column of the matrix 
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A (i.e.  Am,n ) is set to 1, otherwise it is set to 0. t' , and t''  are two 1N vectors, and each 
element represents the gate’s delay  t'  and t''  in different scenarios: 
 t'  is the gate delay with only Vth variation  
 t'' is the gate delay with both Vth variation and body biasing  
Both the delay vectors t' , and t''  are lognormal distribution [4]. 
Furthermore, considering the path number can have an exponential relationship 
with the gate number, a representative path selection stage was employed in Section 2, in 
which the number of representative paths does not exceed the number of gates. 
Therefore, the matrix A  is replaced with the must smaller representative path matrix Ar . 
The same technique in this section is adopted. 
Meanwhile, a vector  b  ( 1M ) is defined as 
 ' , b At IMT   (3.4) 
where T  is the target delay of the circuit. Considering t'  is the delay vector with process 
variation, vector b  is the required delay improvement vector under process variation. 
Based on the above definitions, constraint ' A x b  tt is gotten, which represents 
component-wise inequality, , ' , 1... a x  m tt mb m M , where , 'am tt  is the 
thm  row of 'Att , 
and b m  is the 
thm  element of b ). The constraint means the overall delay improvement 
for paths must be larger than the required delay improvement vector b . This constraint 
cannot be satisfied for the entire variation space of Vth, and this problem is solved by 
adding a penalty term in the objective function in Section 2.  
Here, an alternative formulation of (2.10) is explored, by specifying the variation 




              









  (3.5) 
 
in of decision variables is finite (i.e. N), while the constraints are infinite, which the 
number due to the fact that they include a linear combination of N lognormal distributed 
random variables. The variation space   has a direct impact on the number of gates 
selected as well as the pass rate and needs to be provided by the designer. In this 
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dissertation, 3   is used here to define the boundary  . Since the number of 
constraints is infinite (Vth can be any value in  ), the above formulation is in essence a 
linear semi-infinite programming (LSIP).  
Typical methods to solve LSIP problem include stochastic approach, fuzzy 
approach, interval approach, robust approach and parametric approach, etc. [33]. The 
stochastic approach is difficult to apply here because the dimension of random variables 
in this problem is very high, which makes the empirical distribution is impossible to get. 
The robust approach cannot be used due to the fact that it is based on the uncertain set as 
mentioned in [33]. As such, it is imperative to devise a new method to solve the problem, 
which will be detailed in the following Section 3.3.  
 
3.3. PROPOSED IHCS ALGORITHM 
In this section, an efficient algorithm will be proposed to solve the LSIP problem 
(3.5) using a novel concept of Incremental Hypercubic Sampling (IHCS) approach 
specially tailored to the problem structure. 
The algorithm is inspired by the observation that in the Vth variation space  , 
those scenarios (constraints) with smaller variation should be satisfied with higher 
priority, as they have higher probability to occur. Accordingly, it is very interesting to 
devise an iterative algorithm that handles constraints with smaller Vth variations first. The 




           









  (3.6) 
where 'Aˆtt  and bˆ  in the constraint are a sample of the LSIP problem (3.5) with threshold 
vector Vth0, and   is the timing margin which is positive and less than the timing 
constraint T . The following assumptions for the selective body biasing problem are 
gotten: 
Assumption 1. There exists a small positive number   that the linear 
programming problem in (3.6) is solvable for any Vth within hypercube centered at mean 
threshold vector with side length 2 3   .   
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It has been shown in section 2 that, the timing benefit brought by body biasing for 
a single gate in the sub-threshold regime can cancel its own delay increment in the worst-
case scenario under variation with 3σ/μ = 10%. Here, it is demonstrated that this 
assumption 1 is reasonable using a commercial 65nm library as an example. The 
parameters of 65nm library are listed in Table 3.1.  
Consider the threshold with body biasing in (3.3), and the body biasing voltage is 
400 mV, substitute the parameters in Table 3.1 and the 400 mV (0.4 V) body biasing 
voltage into (3.3), and the change in the threshold voltage caused by body biasing is: 
 
 
, ( | 2 | | 2 |)
0.3757 ( | 2 0.8016 0.4 | 2 0.8016)
0.0560
     
     

th body s SB sV V  
  (3.7) 
Meanwhile, the maximum threshold voltage variation is  
 
 ,max 3 0.1 0.05610.      th th0,V = 0.1 = V     (3.8) 
Therefore, there is , ,max 0   th body thV V , which means the threshold voltage 
changes can cancel the maximum threshold voltage variation with margin. Therefore, 
even for maximum threshold voltage variation ( 3  ), the solution with all ones can 
make sure ' A x b  tt . Therefore, Assumption 1 will hold for this 65nm library. 
Assumption 1 will be workable for other libraries by setting suitable body biasing voltage 
SBV .   
 
Table 3.1 Parameters of 65nm library 
parameters th0,V      sφ  
NMOS 0.5610 0.3757 -0.8016 






Based on Assumption 1, the following Theorem 1is gotten: 
Theorem 1. There exists a small Vth  hypercube centered at Vth0  with side 2 thV   
that the solution x0 of the tighter problem (3.6) can satisfy the constraints ' A x b  tt  for any 
Vth within the small hypercube.   
Proof: 
Considering the definitions of t'  and t'' ,  
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     (3.10) 
where thiV  is threshold voltage with process variation for i-th gate, and 'thiV  is threshold 
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where T  is the target timing constraint of the design.  
Solution 0x  is obtained by solving LP problem (3.6), which means 
 ' 0  A bx 1tt N   (3.13) 
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Now considering a hypercube space centered at  1 2, , ,th th th thNV V V V   with size 
length 2 thV , and on its vertices, the solution 0x  in (3.6) should satisfy the constraint 
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Therefore, substituting (3.16) and (3.18) into (3.15), and after several 
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Considering (3.11)-(3.12), (3.18) can be rewritten as 
  ' 0e e 0.
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  (3.20) 
It is already known that ' 0 A -bx   1tt N , and in order to satisfy (3.20),  thV  
should satisfies   
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It should be noted that (3.21) stands for the following four equations: 
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Solving (3.24)-(3.25), another range requirement of  thV  can be gotten as 
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This ends the proof of Theorem 1. 
A lot of interesting facts can be observed from Theorem 1. The maximum side 
length 2 thV  of the hypercube is related with both the target timing constraint T , and the 
timing margin   according to (29). Therefore, the normalized timing margin is defined 
as T . Meanwhile, the normalized side length with threshold voltage is defined as step 
size, i.e. 0,2 T thV V  . For a commercial 65nm technology, the relation between the step-
size 0,2 T thV V   and the normalized time margin T  is plotted in Figure 3.1. It can be 
observed that the hypercube is monotonically increasing with the normalized timing 
margin, which is intuitive. Meanwhile, according to Assumption 1,  thV  should also be 
limited by 3  too (i.e. 0,2 0.1 T thV V  ). 
  
 

























Normalized timing margin vs normalized step size
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Finally, based on Theorem 1, the following corollaries are derived easily: 
Corollary 1. There exist a minimum spacing r between the samples to cover the 
entire 3   variation space.  
Corollary 2. There exist a finite number of samples to cover the entire 3 
variation space.   
The corollaries pave the road for the IHCS algorithm, which is summarized in 
Algorithm 1. The algorithm samples thV  on an incrementally increased hypercubic 
surface, and for each sample Vˆth , and calculate the corresponding 'Aˆtt  and bˆ  according to 




               









  (3.29) 
Assume the solution of (3.29) is 0x , and the selected gates for each sample are 
combined together. In the next iteration, the elements in x corresponding to the gates 
selected in all previous iterations will be set to 1. Since the surface area of the hypercube 
increases in each iteration, an increased number of samples are used in each iteration. In 
addition, to reduce computation complexity, only a small number of samples will be used 
which may not be enough to cover the entire surface. In the experiments, it is found that 
setting step size as 0.01    and the number of samples as 2 iN  (where i is the 
iteration number) offers a good balance between runtime and solution quality. Moreover, 
from the corollaries as long as in each iteration the surface with a step size  is 
expanded, the entire variation space can be covered. The iterations will be stopped when 
the threshold specified by the designer is reached (if it is smaller than 3  ) or more 
gates than predefined parameter K have been selected as body biasing. 
Apparently, the algorithm has the benefit that scenarios with smaller variations 
are covered with higher priority (in earlier iterations). This should lead to significantly 
improved pass rate, as will be validated in experimental results. Meanwhile, it is 
straightforward to have the following Theorem 2: 
Theorem 2. The pass rate increases monotonically with the number of iterations in 
IHCS.   
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Algorithm 1: Incremental Hypercubic Sampling (IHCS) 
Initial: Set all elements of xs  to be zeros; 01, i   ; 
Loop: 0 0 0.1 ; )   for ( = ;           
.1a   Loop: ; 1)  ifor (j = 1; j n j j  
         Sample ,th jV  on the surface of hypercube  
         centered at 0thV  with side length   02 1  i   
               Get the optimal solution x j  by solving (3.29)  
               End Loop 
.2a     Merge all ones in solutions
1 2, ,...,x x xni  to   
        form a new vector x
is
 
      .3a    1 i i   
.4a     Update the elements of xs to be ones                      
          according to the  solution x
is
. 
.5a     
0
) ; .1xsif  ( K exit else goto a  
Output: Final solution 
sx                
 
 
The proof is trivial considering the fact that each iteration keeps the gates already 
selected and adds more gates for body biasing.  
Finally, a single path with two gates as a simple two-dimensional example is used 
to illustrate the IHCS algorithm. In this example there are only two random variables Vth1 
and Vth2. The variation space of Vth1 and Vth2 is shown as Figure 3.2 (a), in which the 
origin of coordinate has been relocated at (Vth1,Vth2). Then a few thV  on the square with 
side 2 is randomly sampled. By solving the related ILP problems and merging the 
solutions, the area surrounded by the square will be covered, as shown in Figure 3.2 (b). 
Then the side of the square is expanded to 4 , and sampled on the new surface. After 
solving the related ILP problems and merging the solution, the area surrounded by the 
expanded square is covered as shown in Figure 3.2 (d). This process continues until the 
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required variance specified by the designer is covered or too many gates have been 
selected as body biasing. 
It should be noted that, even though the power overhead is still used as the 
minimization target as Section 2. It is straightforward to extend the proposed IHCS 
approach to take into account other optimization targets, such as the layout and routing 
overhead, etc. It is only necessary to modify the optimization targets of the ILP.   
 
 
Figure 3.2 A two-dimension example of proposed IHCS algorithm workflow 
 
 
3.4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The proposed IHCS algorithm is implemented and the APA-BA-PP algorithm in 
MATLAB. The simulations were performed based on six 65 nm industrial sub-threshold 
designs as listed in Table 3.2, which includes the path number, gate number along with 
the rank of matrix A  (the number of representative paths) for each design.  The supply 
voltage is 200 mV, and the body biasing voltage is set to -400 mV for PMOS and 400 
mV for NMOS. The body biasing voltage is selected so that when all the gates are biased, 















this section were obtained through 10K Monte Carlo simulations. In each simulation, it 
works only if all the paths satisfy the target delay, otherwise it fails. The pass rate is 
defined as the percentage of Monte Carlo samples without timing violations out of the 
10K samples. The experiments were conducted on a workstation equipped with quad-
core 2.4 GHz CPU and 96 GB RAM.  
 
Table 3.2 Summary of six 65 nm sub-threshold designs 
Design Gate number Path number Rank 
T1 168 75,383 122 
T2 496 5830 248 
T3 546 916,719 311 
T4 892 729,045 460 
T5 1,269 462,140 379 
T6 3,513 685,908 - 
 
 
Firstly, the pass rate is compared and standby power of the proposed IHCS 
algorithm with all body biasing and APA-BA-PP algorithm in section 2 for all six test 
cases. For fair comparison, the pass rate is compared under the same selected gate 
percentage, and the results are shown in Table 3.3. Different Vth variations are used to 
report meaningful pass rates as the designs are of different sizes. The percentage of gates 
selected for body biasing is also reported for both APA-BA-PP and IHCS algorithm. 
According to the data in Table 3.3, all body biasing always achieve 100% pass rate, but 
with much higher power consumption compared with APA-BA-PP and IHCS algorithm. 
Meanwhile, compared with APA-BA-PP, the proposed IHCS algorithm has up to 82% 
pass rate improvement, which means that IHCS achieves better performance (pass rate). 
The runtime comparison between the proposed IHCS algorithm and APA-BA-PP 
is shown in Table 3.4. According to the table, IHCS algorithm can improve the runtime 
up to 2x on average compared with APA-BA-PP. The only case where IHCS requires 
longer runtime is Design T1. This is probably because the proposed algorithm has not 
been optimized for small designs, where the number of samples can be reduced.  
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Table 3.3 Comparison of pass rate among different approach 
design 


















T1 0.04 100% 45% 79% 0.35 0.09 0.09 19.64% 
T2 0.05 100% 30% 93% 0.86 0.18 0.18 21.17% 
T3 0.03 100% 96% 96% 1.08 0.29 0.29 26.73% 
T4 0.04 100% 39% 55% 1.70 0.23 0.23 13.34% 
T5 0.06 100% 86% 86% 2.25 0.22 0.22 8.06% 
T6 0.03 100% 13% 95% 6.35 1.06 1.06 16.43% 
 
 




T1 7.23 (1) 13.90 1/(0.5X) 
T2 17.72 (1) 17.64 (1/1.0X) 
T3 34.99 (1) 13.67 (1/2.6X) 
T4 47.01 (1) 17.03(1/2.8X) 
T5 75.04 (1) 17.99(1/4.1X) 
T6 140.01 (1) 139.00(1/1.0X) 
 
 
According to Theorem 1, the step size of  thV  will impact the final solution 
drastically, and design T2 is used to verify the effect of step size on pass rate. The result 
is shown in Figure 3.3. From the figure, it is clear that the pass rate reduces with the 
increase of step size. This is intuitively in accordance with Corollaries 1 and 2: with too 
big of a step size, the solutions from the samples on the expanded hybercubic surface are 
not enough to cover the gap. On the other hand, the runtime also increases rapidly as the 
step size decreases. It is found that setting the step size to 0.01, which has been used 




Figure 3.3 The impact of step size on pass rate at different Vth variance for design T2. 
 
 
Then, the same design T2 is used to demonstrate the relationship between the pass 
rate and the number of samples used in each iteration, which is shown in Figure. 3.4. 
From the figure it is seen that the pass rate improves as more samples are taken in each 
iteration, which is as expected. The increase of the sample number on the other hand has 
a negative impact on runtime, and in the experiments it is figured out that setting the 
number of samples to be 2 iN  offers a good balance between runtime and pass rate.  
Finally, using Cadence encounter, the core layout of T2 with selected body 
biasing is given in Figure 3.5  to study the area overhead of the proposed algorithm. 
Based on the proposed IHSC, 105 out of 496 gates are selected in T2, and the total area 
overhead is 0.9% compared with the original design without body biasing, which is really 
small (the size is labeled in the layout). Considering that the area overhead is from both 
biasing gates and routing, the wire length overhead is also given to show the contribution 
of different parts. The total wire length is 3,387 um for the design without body biasing, 
and 3,703 um for the design with body biasing, a 2% overhead. 
 



























IHCS (step size: 0.005)
IHCS (step size: 0.01)
IHCS (step size: 0.02)




Figure 3.4 The impact of sample numbers in each iteration on pass rate  at different Vth 




Figure 3.5 Layout of design T2 with body biasing. 
 
 


































In this Section, the selective body biasing problem for sub-threshold designs is 
reformulated as an SIP problem. Then an efficient algorithm based on the novel concept 
of Incremental Hypercubic Sampling (IHCS), specially tailored to the problem structure, 
is proposed along with the convergence analysis. Compared with the state-of-the-art 
approach based on adaptive filtering, experimental results on industrial designs using 
65nm sub-threshold library demonstrate that the proposed approach can improve the pass 
rate by up to 7.3x with a speedup to 4.1x, using the same number of body biasing gates 




4. PART II: ON RANDOM DYNAMIC VOLTAGE SCALING IN 
CORRELATION POWER ANALYSIS: A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH  
With the massive deployment of mobile devices and sensor networks, the demand 
of low powered devices with high security becomes more and more urgent. RDVS 
technology is a very efficient method to improve the resistance of cryptosystem against 
side-channel attacks. In this section, it is demonstrated that the resistance can be 
undermined by providing lower off-chip power supply voltage. In order to address this 
issue, the following method is proposed in this dissertation. The off-chip power supply 
voltage will be monitored, and an alarm could be triggered to protect valued information 
once the power supply voltage is lower than the expected voltage (threshold voltage). 
However, considering the maintenance cost and the environment noise on power supply 
voltage, this problem is further formulated as a non-zero sum game model, and the 
attacker and the circuit supplier (defender) are the players of this game. The analysis of 
the Nash equilibrium in this game shed light on the choice of the optimal threshold 
voltage based on parameters of cryptosystem including the value of information, denial-
of-service cost, etc. 
The remainder of this section is organized as follows: Section 4.1 introduces the 
basic background and motivation, and Section 4.2 reviews cryptography and CPA, 
together with the motivation of the proposed game theoretic approach. Section 4.3 details 
the proposed game theoretic approach and Section 4.4 presents the experimental results. 
Concluding remarks are given in Section 4.5. 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
With the massive development of mobile devices like phones and tablets as well 
as sensor networks for civil and military applications, securing cryptographic device 
against SCA has become a very hot research topic in recent years. One of the most 
popular cryptographic devices used in these security sensitive devices is the smart card, 
which provides the security identification and authentication for those applications.  How 
to secure these cryptographic devices from various attacks has grown to become an active 
research topic recently. 
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Conventional security measures employ various cryptographic algorithms, 
including Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Data Encryption Standard (DES) [34] 
[35], RSA (named after its inventors Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) [36]-[38] and Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC) [39] [40]. Theoretically, those algorithms shall provide 
strong resistance against cyber attacks. However, when they are implemented in 
hardware, side-channel attackers can still get the correct key easily. 
One early example of side-channel attack is the DPA [41], which computes a 
differential trace based on a hypothesis of the secret key to manifest the points where the 
key bits were manipulated. It can directly reveal the private key or significantly narrow 
down the key search space. DPA later evolved and the CPA was developed. With details 
reviewed in Section 4.2.1, CPA is more efficient and effective compared with DPA.  
The only way to resist side-channel attack is to enhance hardware implementation 
and reduce power peaks and correlations. Various works exist in this regard [42]-[45]. 
However, most of them are deterministic in nature. In other words, the same plaintext 
always results in the same power trace under a given key. Accordingly, attackers can still 
repeat the same pattern multiple times to accumulate small deviations in power traces to 
assist the attack.  
An early attempt to address this issue through random precharging was discussed 
in [46], which is still not completely secure against DPA. Random Dynamic Voltage and 
Frequency Scaling (RDVFS) as a countermeasure was proposed in [47], which did 
enhance the resistance of the cryptosystem to power attacks. It is later demonstrated in 
[48] that RDVS alone provides better resistance against DPA, and the evaluation about 
the effectiveness of RDVS against CPA was given in [49].  
However, according to the analysis given below, the attacker can improve the 
performance of power analysis by providing lower power supply voltage to RDVS 
cryptosystem.  
The following Figure 4.1 (a) and Figure 4.1 (b) demonstrate the impact of scaling 
range on CPA resistance. In Figure 4.1, the X-axis represents the indices of the power 
trace samples, and the Y-axis represents the correlation coefficients of each hypothetical 
key. The correct key is plotted in black, and all other keys are plotted in grey. For CPA, 
the instantaneous power consumption during the DATA transitions is the most important 
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information, which means the highest correlation peaks happen at the data transition. 
Therefore, if the correlation coefficients of the correct key (black) are higher than those 
of other keys (grey) at this time, CPA is successful. It can be observed that that larger 
scaling range in RDVS can improve the CPA resistance. In contrast, lower voltage 
scaling range decreases the resistance of system to power attack. Therefore, this allows 
the possibility that the attacker can decrease the voltage scaling range by manipulating 
the DC-DC converters in order to facilitate the success of CPA. 
For many DC-DC converters including the switched-capacitor DC-DC buck 
converters, and inductive buck converter , there exist a linear relationship between output 
and input, and it will be demonstrated that lower supply voltage to DC-DC converters 
will give smaller output voltage range (i.e. smaller scaling voltage range in RDVS) in 
Section 4.2.2. Therefore, the attackers can retrieve the secret key of the system more 
quickly by using lower attack power supply. In order to improve the resistance to CPA of 
RDVS cryptosystem under low supply voltage, the following method is proposed in this 
dissertation. Firstly, the off-chip power supply voltage will be monitored, and an alarm 
could be triggered to protect valued information once the power supply voltage is lower 
than the expect 
In theory, larger threshold voltage could help filtering the power attacks, however, 
normal changes on supply voltage caused by noise may be also taken as power attacks, 
which will cause loss of defenders. In fact, either for the defender or the attacker, both the 
threshold voltage and the attack power supply voltage impact their gain or loss. The 
strategy of the defender is to take different threshold voltages and corresponding strategy 
of the attacker is to use different attack power supply voltages. The problem between the 
attacker and the defender can be formulated as a game, and it is very interesting to figure 
out the optimal strategy for both the defender and the attacker. Therefore, in this paper, a 
game theoretic approach is proposed to analyze the problem between the attacker and the 
defender in RDVS power attack resistant cryptosystem. 
 
4.2. PRELIMINARIES 
With the massive development of mobile devices like phones and tablets as well 









Figure 4.1 CPA result with Temporal DVS (a) 1.8/1.5V Temporal DVS. (b) 1.8/1.2V 
Temporal DVS 
 










































against SCA has become a very hot research topic in recent years. One of the most 
popular cryptographic devices used in these security sensitive devices is the smart card, 
which provides the security identification and authentication for those applications.  How 
to secure these cryptographic devices from various attacks has grown to become an active 
research topic recently. 
4.2.1. Cryptographic System and CPA. Symmetric key ciphers have simpler 
and faster encryption and decryption processes. However, because of their shared key 
policy, they are more prone to attacks. Hence, generally keys are distributed between two 
channels using more secured and computationally intensive asymmetric key ciphers, and 
information is shared using symmetric key ciphers. AES and DES are some of the well-
known symmetric key ciphers. The best known asymmetric ciphers include RSA and 
ECC. 
CPA is a more effective attacking method compared with DPA [50]. It analyzes 
the correlative relationship between the plaintext/cipher-text and instantaneous power 
consumption of the cryptographic device. In order to do CPA attack, a power model (e.g. 
Hamming Weight (HW) model) [54] needs to be built to predict the power consumption 
in terms of hypothetical keys and input/output data; then, the predicted power is 
compared with the measured power using a Person correlation coefficient algorithm [51]. 
If CPA is successful, the correlation coefficients between the predicted power and the 
measured power will be significantly higher when the hypothetical key is the secret key 
[52]. 
4.2.2. Design Description.  In the previous work [49] [52], an AES S-Box in 
VHDL has been designed to demonstrate the effectiveness of RDVS. Here, this S-Box is 
used again as the vehicle to verify the proposed game theoretic approach in this paper. 
The designed S-Box is synthesized in Xilinx ISE EDA tool, and is downloaded on an 
evaluation FPGA board (SASEBO-GII), which is designed and developed for the purpose 
of side-channel attack experiments by the Research Center for Information Security 
(RCIS) in Tokyo, Japan [53].   
By measuring the voltage across a shunt resistor of the FPGA board, the current 
of the FPGA can be gotten. By multiplying it with the core voltage of the FPGA, the 
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power consumption can be obtained. Such an approach improves the efficiency to obtain 
realistic data compared with software simulation.  
The collected power data, measured under constant supply voltage, is then 
processed through MATLAB to include the RDVS based on the common knowledge that 
power scales quadratically with the supply voltage [54]. This mimics the real S-Box 
design with RDVS. The supply voltage is chosen randomly from a number of pre-set 
voltages, which can either be provided externally or obtained through on-chip DC-DC 
converters, based on a random number generator (RNG).  
4.2.2.1 RDVS System.  The RDVS Cryptosystem diagram is shown in Figure 
4.2, where the power gird of the system is chosen randomly from four different power 
grids according to the RNG. The source of power grids are outputs of DC-DC converters 
and off-chip power supply, and the simplest switched-capacitor DC-DC converter is the 
best choice in this application considering the balance between cost and performance. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 System diagram of RDVS S-Box. 
 
 
4.2.2.2 Random number generator. To implement RNG, a simple Linear 
Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) counter [55] is explored here, which is easy to 




















Figure 4.3, where the period of pseudo random number generated is 256. More shift 
registers can provide stronger randomness, but at the cost of area overhead. On the other 
side, for some applications such as smart cards, RNGs with stronger randomness may be 
readily available and can be directly utilized. In previous experiments, it has been 
demonstrated that stronger randomness can significantly improve CPA resistance [48].  
 
Figure 4.3 Part of the random number generator cycles of LSFR. 
 
 
4.2.2.3 DC-DC converter. There are a lot of linear DC-DC converters. and here 
the DC-DC converter from [57] is chosen, which is shown in Figure 4.4. There are two 
DC-DC converters in the system, and they share the same structure with different 
resistors and inductors to obtain different output voltages. The relationship between the 
output voltage and input voltage is linear for this DC-DC converter [57], therefore, it is 
proved that the voltage range decreases by providing lower power supply voltage (input 
voltage of the DC-DC converters). Therefore, the following (4.1) can be gotten as:     
 

























  (4.1) 
 
where, ddV   is the normal power supply voltage and the input voltage of DC-DC 
converter, and dd1V  and dd2V   are the outputs of DC-DC converter under ddV . ddV '  is the 
lower power supply voltage used by the attacker, and dd1V '  and dd2V '  are the 
corresponding output voltage of DC-DC converter. a  and b are the coefficients of DC-
DC converter, which are smaller than 1. Then the voltage range of RDVS S-box can be 
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4.2.2.4 Power supply voltage monitor.  Considering the fact that the change of 
power supply voltage will impact the gate delay, the power supply voltage can be 
monitored by measuring the gate delay. The idea of critical-path monitor (CPM) is 
borrowed here to monitor the change of gate delay, which was proposed to measures 
critical path delay and the effects of noise and localized Vdd droops on delay in [59]. Due 
to the fact that many timing paths may be critical, the CPM in [59] uses a small number 
of delay paths with different delay versus process, voltage and temperature curves to 
synthesize the critical paths. However, in this dissertation, only changes of power supply 
voltage need to be monitored, and do not have to synthesize the critical path.  
Therefore, a simplified power supply voltage monitor (PVM) is designed here 
based on the structure of CPM, which has less power and area overhead. The block 
diagram of VPM is shown in Figure 4.5, which is mainly composed of three parts: AND 
path delay unit, edge detector and comparator. The minimum resolution of the edge 
detector is one FO2 delay. The threshold voltage is coded to 6-bit, and will be the 
reference input of the comparator. For the edge detector, taking the 1-to-0 transition of B 
as an example, the outputs of inverters is (0)101010, where the first 0 in brackets is value 
of B. When the rising edge of B arrives and just propagates the first two inverters, the 
output of inverters is (1)011010. Therefore, the edge of B could be captured on the rising 
edge of the clock and the code based on the position of edge of B is gotten after the 
XOR/XNOR array, which indicates the AND path delay. 
 
4.3. GAME MODEL AND ANALYSIS 
Considering the fact that lower power supply voltage results in smaller scaling 
range, which decreases the resistance of system to power attack [49], the attacker can 
improve the efficiencies of attack by using a lower power supply voltage. In order to 
verify this point, some experiments will be firstly presented. Figure 4.6 shows the CPA 
analysis of the same RDVS S-Box system for 1.7v power supply and a lower 1.5v power 
supply voltage. The X-axis represents the number of traces and Y-axis represents the 
correlation value at the time of data transients. The correct key is plotted in black, and 
other keys are plotted in grey. For the attack using 1.7v power supply, the correlation 




Figure 4.5 Block diagram of the VPM and edge detector 
 
 
the number of power traces achieves 4000, which means that CPA would fail. However, 
for the attack using 1.5v power supply, the correct key stands out from other keys when 
the number of traces is around 3500. Therefore, it demonstrates that lower power supply 
voltage makes the attack easier, and it is very necessary for the defender to take this issue 
into account when using DVS in cryptosystem. 
In all, the problem can be summarized as below: the designer/user of 
cryptosystem is the defender, and their purpose is to avoid information leakage in power 
trace at lower attack voltage by monitoring the supply voltage. On the other side, the 
attacker will try to get the secret key using CPA approach by decreasing the voltage 
scaling range without triggering the alarm, and the gain of the attacker definitely is the 
loss of the defender. Both the defender and the attacker are trying their best to maximize 
their own gain. Therefore, the problem could be formulated as a non-cooperative game 
between the attacker and the defender, and the following assumptions are given before 
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Figure 4.6 Number of traces needed for successful CPA attack (a) for 1.8v power supply 
attack. (b) for 1.7v power supply attack 
 
 












































Firstly, integrated DC-DC converters are widely employed to convert a single off-
chip voltage V0 to multiple on-chip voltages V1, V2, V3, etc. Meanwhile, as mentioned 
in Section 4.2, the output of DC-DC converter is linear with the input. This assumption is 
demonstrated both by simulation result in Section 4.2.2 and reference [34]. 
Furthermore, attackers are rare among all users, which is very reasonable in 
practice. The attacker’s target is to retrieve the secret key of the S-Box, from which 
he/she can gain access to valuable information of value F. Otherwise, if he fails to gain 
the information, the gain of the attacker will be 0. It’s of the attacker’s interest to obtain 
the secret key as quickly as possible, and the attacker will not give up until they get the 
secret key. Here, the following behavior of the attacker is assumed, and it will not affect 
the problem formulation and the game model. Firstly, the attacker will gather K  power 
traces, and then the attacker will try keys one by one following the order of correlation 
coefficient since the top one key. Accordingly, the cost of attack is composed of two 
parts, which is the cost of K power traces E  and the cost of  R  from trying keys. Here, 
E  is the cost of gathering K power traces, R  is the rank of correct key, and    is the 
trying cost of per key.   
Finally, it is assumed that the noise of power grid is additively Gaussian 
distributed, with zero mean and known standard deviation, and the noise is long-time 
noise. Therefore, the noise will not impact on attacker during the short time attacking. 
However, it does impact on the defender, who needs to maintain the cryptosystem during 
its lifetime.   
Now, the description of the system could be summarized here. The defender built 
a cryptosystem with RDVS to improve the resistance of cryptosystem to power analysis 
attack (CPA in this paper). The cryptosystem is composed of RDVS S-Box, random 
number generator and DC-DC converters, and the diagram of the system is shown in 
Figure 4.2. On the other hand, the attacker prefers to attack the system using a lower off-
chip supply voltage, which reduces the voltage range of RDVS cryptosystem, and makes 
the attack easier.  
In summary, the defender’s strategy is: monitor the voltage coming from off-chip 
and set the threshold to Si, Si is from a threshold sets S= {S1, S2, ..SN}. When the 
voltage drops below Si, an alarm will be triggered and the secrete key and all information 
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stored in the memory will be erased. However, the alarm can either be triggered by the 
attacker, or due to environmental noise. When this happens, the chip needs to be returned 
to the defender, who will then pick up another chip and reprogram a different secret key. 
To avoid attackers from detecting the threshold Si through multiple trials, the threshold 
needs to be randomly distributed among chips. 
The attacker’s strategy is to use a lower off-chip voltage set V(V1, V2, …, VM), 
and try different keys until the information is obtained. Assume that both the attacker and 
the defender are rational, and the attacker will not stop until the secret key is gotten. 
Because, the gain will be definitely negative if the attacker stops attacking, and it is very 
possible that the secret key goes out in next trying.  
The gain for attack and defender is defined respectively as below. 
For the attacker, the following situations are defined:  
1) Gain is G   . 
If the alarm of cryptosystem is triggered, it will cause maintenance cost of the 
defender, and it is defined as the denial-of-service cost G , which is positive value. Under 
this situation, the gain of attacker is G .  
2) Gain is F (E R )     .  
If the alarm is not triggered, the attacker will not stop until the secret key is 
gotten, and the cost of attack includes power trace measurement cost E and key trying 
cost R . Therefore, the gain of attacker is F (E R )   under this case. 
 NOTE 1: The probability of failed attack is zero. Failed attack is defined as, the 
attacker does not get secret key and the effort has already be spent. That is because, if the 
probability is not zero, which means that cryptosystem is strong enough to resist power 
attack analysis.    
NOTE 2: F is larger than G, otherwise it makes no sense to detect the attacker.    
On the other hand, the gain for the defender is defined as:  
1) DS1: Gain is G .  
When alarm is triggered because of the attacker, it will result in the denial-of-
service cost to the defender, in the form of G .  
2) DS2: Gain is PC .  
  
65 
PC  is the cost when the alarm is triggered due to the noise, where P   is the 
probability of the alarm is triggered due to the noise, and C   is the denial-of-service cost 
if the system is down due to noise. Note, for defender, whatever the alarm is triggered by 
attacker or the noise, the denial-of-service cost should be the same. Considering our 
model is built between one attacker and the defender, the denial-of-service cost caused by 
attacker just happen to one single device. However, the denial-of-service cost due to 
noise could happen to all devices is the cryptosystem is network with multiple devices. 
Therefore,  C  may be either  G  if the cryptosystem is a single device system or K G   
when the system is network, where is the number of components of the network. NOTE 
3: Just as mentioned above, the noise of power grid is long-time noise, and it only 
impacts the defender but not the attacker.    
Both the attacker and the defender are rational. The attacker runs CPA analysis to 
maximize the gain of attack, while the defender looks for optimal threshold voltage to 
minimize their loss. Assume that the defined costs above are common knowledge 
between the attacker and the defender. More precisely, both the attacker and the defender 
share the following knowledge: Denial-of-service cost G , Value of information F  and 
Parameters of attacker’s cost E, .    
Now, a simple example is used to show how the game theoretic approach works 
in this section. Without loss of generality, assume the defender has two (N=2) different 
threshold voltages, and  
 1 2S {S ,S } {low,high}    (4.3) 
The attacker also has 2 (M=2) different attack voltages 
 1 2T {T ,T } {low,high}.    (4.4) 
   According to the gain definition, the normal form of the game between the 
attacker and the defender can be gotten in Table 4.1. For {T low,S low}  , the attacker 
voltage T1 equals to the threshold voltage S1, and the low supply voltage alarm will be 
triggered. Therefore, the gain of attacker is G . On the other hand, the gain of defender is 
lowG P C  , where lowP  the probability of the alarm is triggered due to the noise under 
low threshold voltage. For  {T low,S high}  , the attacker voltage T1 is smaller than 
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the threshold voltage S1, which will trigger the low supply voltage alarm, too. The gain 
of attacker is G , and the gain of defender is highG P C  , where highP  is the probability of 
the alarm is triggered due to the noise under high threshold voltage. For 
{T high,S low}  , the attacker voltage T2 is larger than the threshold voltage S1, and 
the secret key could be gotten after K  power traces are gathered. Under this situation, the 
gain of attacker is F (E R )   , and the corresponding gain of the defender is lowF P C  . 
Just like {T low,S high}  , same gain for attacker and defender can be gotten under 
{T high,S high}  . 
 






lowG P C   
G , 
highG P C   
High 
 
F (E R )   , 
lowF P C   
G , 
highG P C   
 
 
Note, this model still works when considering any other different sets S and T, 
and M do not have to equal to N. 
The Nash equilibria are gotten by analyzing the Table 4.1, and there are total three 
different possible cases in this example.  
Note, there is low highP P    in Table II.  
1). Case 1:  
If  G F (E R )    , it means that the denial-of-service cost is high, or the cost 
attack is high. Under this case, the attacker will try to create denial of service, and the 
gain of attacker G  is maximized. Therefore, (low, low), (low, high) and (high, high) may 
be Nash equilibria. On the other hand, the defender tries to avoid the denial of service due 
to noise, and considering that low highP P , (low, low) is the Nash equilibria 1 (NE1).  
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2.) Case 2:  
If G F (E R )    & low highF P C G P C     , it may happen when the denial-of-
service cost is low or the cost per trial is low, and the information value is high. The 
attacker tries to use a high supply voltage to guarantee the success of attack, and 
considering 
low highF P C G P C     , the defender also tries to use a low threshold 
voltage to achieve the gain 
lowF P C  . Therefore, in this case, (high, low) is the Nash 
equilibria 2 (NE2).  




G F (E R )
,
F P C G P C
   

    
  (4.5) 
 high low(P P )C E R ,       (4.6) 
which means only when parameters satisfy relationship of (6), it is possible to achieve 
NE2.  
3.) Case 3:  
If 
low highF P C G P C     , the defender will try to use high threshold voltage to 
maximum the gain, then either (low, high) named as NE3 or (high, high) named as NE4 
could be Nash equilibria. 
Note, the condition of case 1 and case 3 may be true at the same time, which 
means both NE1 and NE3/NE4 may be Nash equilibria for some cases. Therefore the 
game model will be a mixed strategy game, and this will be proved in Section 4.4 using 
the given example.  
 
4.4. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
Different applications and cryptosystems mean different parameters ( G,F,E, ,C ). 
In order to observe the effect of different parameters on Nash equilibria, CPA 
experiments are run based on analysis in Section 4.3.   
In the CPA experiments, 1.8/1.5V RDVS S-box is used as the cryptosystem, and 
simulations are run following the attacker behavior defined in Section 4.3.  In the 
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experiments, 5000 power traces are gathered firstly following the way mentioned in 
Section 4.2. Then the rank of secret key is gotten by sorting result of CPA analysis in 
Matlab. The experimental results are summarized in Table 4.2, where T is the power 
supply voltage using by the attacker. 1.8v is included here also as reference, and the rank 
of 1.8v is 110, which is much larger than the rank using lower power supply voltage and 
demonstrates the high efficiency of CPA using lower power supply. All following 
experiments are using the values of R in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2 Rank of secret key in CPA analysis to DVS S-box 
T(v) 







In order to observe the effect of each parameter on Nash equilibrium, the value of 
parameters are chosen as shown in Table 4.3, which is obtained based on the S-box 
system, and use 1.5v/1.7v as the low/high voltage. Each time, only one parameter is 
changed and the rest of parameters are fixed to value in Table 4.3. Therefore, five 
different experiments are done in the following Sub-section 4.4.1. 
 
Table 4.3 Value of parameters 
Parameter Meaning of Parameter Value 
G  Denial-of-service cost 3 
F  Value of information 5 
C  Denial-of-service cost caused by noise 60 
β  trying cost of per key 0.005 





Furthermore, considering that the noise of power grid is additive with zero mean 
Gaussian distribution, the value of 
1.5P  ( lowP ) and 1.7P  ( highP ) can be gotten by setting the 
standard deviation 0.05  , which is reasonable considering most of the noise will not 
exceed [ 3*0.05v, 3*0.05v]   , i.e. [ 0.15v, 0.15v]  . 
 
 1.5P 0.00   (4.7) 
 1.7P 0.02   (4.8) 
4.4.1. Mixed Nash Equilibrium Analysis.  Substitute 
1.5 1.7P ,P ,R  in Table 4.2  
and Table 4.3  into Table 4.1, it is verified that the game does not admit a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium. If the defender chooses 1.5v as the threshold voltage to minimize the 
loss under (1.5v, 1.5v), however the attacker will use 1.7v to achieve the maximum gain 
under 1.5v threshold voltage, which makes the defender suffer more loss (-5). Therefore, 
the defender then goes to 1.7v as the threshold voltage, and the Nash equilibria will be 
either NE3 or NE4. 
Two mixed strategy Nash equilibria are calculated by the game solver from [58] 
that they are denoted as (5) and (6). The mixed-strategy Nash solution for the attacker is 
shown in Figure 4.7, on the other hand, the defender just has one strategy (1.7v) as shown 
in (5) and (6). In all the two possible Nash equilibria, the gain of the attacker is 3.0 while 
the gain of the defender is -4.2.  
 
 {0.4(1.5) 0.6(1.7);1.0(1.7)}   (4.9) 





Figure 4.7 Attacker’s mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. 
 
 
4.4.2. Effect of Parameters on Nash Equilibrium. Still using the same 
parameters in Table 4.3, and above 
1.5 1.7P ,P ,R    in Table 4.1, experiments are done to 
observe the effect of parameters on Nash equilibrium. All following results are from 
game solver  in [58].  
Taking G  as the variable, and the other parameters as constant with values in 
Table 4.3, Figure 4.8 is presented to show the Nash equilibria and gain of 
attacker/defender v.s. G . According to Figure 4.8, the Nash equilibria will be NE1 when 
increasing G , and NE1 will also be a possible Nash equilibria when   and E are 
increased as shown in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10. This experimental result matches the 
analysis about case 1 in Section 4.3, which means when denial-of-service cost or the cost 
attack (  and E ) is high, and Nash equilibria is NE1. On the other hand, the gain of 
attacker increases with G , in contrast the gain (loss) of the defender decreases (increases) 
with G , which means the defender should try to decrease the denial-of-service cost G  in 
order to minimize the loss. Please note, when  / E   is larger than 0.03/1.755, there are 
three possible Nash equilibria NE3, NE4 and NE1, therefore, the gain of attacker is 






































Attacker's pure strategies 










































Figure 4.10 Nash equilibria v.s. E. 
 
 
When information value F is very high, the gain of defender 
1.5F P C   under 
(1.7v, 1.5v) will be far smaller than other gains, therefore, defender will choose 1.7v as 
the threshold voltage to avoid heavy loss, which means NE3(NE4) will be Nash 
equilibria as in Figure 4.11. When F  is large enough, the gain of attacker and the loss of 
defender keep constant, i.e., 3.0 as the gain of attacker and 4.2 as the loss of defender, 
which are shown in Figure 4.11.   
According to Table 4.3, when the cost caused by noise C  is large,  
1.7G P C   
decreases, the defender will use low threshold voltage under this situation, and the Nash 
equilibria may be either NE1 or NE2. Then the attacker will decide the equilibrium based 
on their gain, in this example, gain of attacker under NE2 is larger than under NE1. 
Therefore, with the increase of C , NE2 will be the Nash equilibria as shown in Figure 
4.12. 
Based on above experimental results, the gain of attacker and defender will keep 
constant with increasing F,E, ,C except for G . Therefore, it is very important for the 



















































Based on the observation in [49], it is demonstrated that the attacker could 
improve the effectiveness of CPA to RDVS S-box cryptosystem by using low power 
supply voltage. On the other hand, the defender could protect the cryptosystem by setting 
threshold voltage to trigger an alarm when the power supply voltage is low. Furthermore, 
the problem between the attacker and the defender is formulated as a game, and a game-
theoretic methodology is proposed to analyze both the optimal attacking power supply 
voltage for the attacker and the detection threshold voltage for the defender.   
Theoretical analysis is done to calculate the Nash equilibria, which is also verified 
using a game solver in this dissertation. The following important properties are gotten 
based on the analysis: 
1) When denial-of-service cost or the cost of attack is high, Nash equilibrium prefers 
to locate at low threshold voltage and low attack power supply voltage (NE1 in 
the example).  
2) When information value F is very high, high threshold voltage and high attack 
power supply voltage goes to Nash equilibria (NE4 in the example). 
3) Only when the cost of alarm triggered due to noise is high, NE2 may be the Nash 
equilibria, which represents the attack behavior.  
Based on these properties, only when the condition of (3) is true, the attacker will 
attack the system, therefore, the defender can avoid attack under most of cases by 
choosing right threshold voltage. 
Another important result of the proposed methodology is that the loss of the 
defender is decided by the value of secret information, and the payoff when the alarm is 
triggered, which is already known and can be decided by the defender. Furthermore, the 
probability of alarm trigged by noise for different threshold voltage can be also derived, 
and then the defender will know the exact range of the loss under different threshold 
voltage. Therefore, the proposed approach could help the defender find the conditions 
that limit their loss to expected value for different cryptosystems with different 




5. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK  
5.1. SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
The first part of this dissertation studies and solves the timing violation problem 
caused by process variation in sub-threshold designs. Sub-threshold designs are a popular 
option in many energy constrained applications. However, a major bottleneck for these 
designs is the challenge in attaining timing closure. Most of the paths in sub-threshold 
designs can become critical paths due to the purely random process variation on threshold 
voltage, which exponentially impacts the gate delay. In order to address timing violations 
caused by process variation, post-silicon tuning is widely used through body biasing 
technology at the cost of heavy power and area overhead. Therefore, it is imperative to 
select only a small group of the gates with body biasing for post-silicon-tuning. 
Existed body biasing schemes with multiple body biasing voltage domains and 
multiple body biasing voltage levels involve not just routing overhead but also design 
control complexity. Therefore, the first contribution of this dissertation is to explore the 
possibility of using only one body bias voltage domain with a single body bias voltage in 
sub-threshold design. This selective body biasing scheme only involves modest area 
overhead based on the experiment result, and no extra control circuit is needed. 
Therefore, the proposed scheme is very practical for low cost and low power design.  
In the first work, the selective body biasing problem is formulated as an 
optimization model with statistical inequality constraints. To the best knowledge of 
authors, this is the first time that this selective body biasing problem is formulated as a 
optimization problem, and it is further solved through an adaptive algorithm, which is the 
second contribution of this dissertation.  
In order to achieve a better solution for the selective body biasing problem, the 
problem is reformulated alternatively as a LSIP problem, and propose an efficient IHCS 
algorithm to solve the LSIP problem with a finite number of mixed-integer linear 
programming. Compared with the adaptive filtering approach, experimental results on 
industrial designs using 65nm sub-threshold library demonstrate that the new IHCS 
approach can improve the pass rate by up to 7.3x with a speed up to 4.1x, using the same 
number of body biasing gates and about the same power consumption. 
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The second part of this dissertation studies the attack and defense problem in 
power analysis attack to RDVS system. It is demonstrated that the resistance of RDVS 
system to CPA can be undermined by providing lower off-chip power supply voltage. In 
order to improve the resistance under lower attack voltage, the defender can insert power 
voltage monitor into the cryptosystems and trigger an alarm to protect valued information 
once the power supply voltage is lower than the expected voltage (threshold voltage). The 
problem is further formulated as a non-zero sum game model, and the attacker and the 
circuit supplier (defender) are the players of this game. The S-box is used in this 
dissertation as the vehicle to show how the game model works, but it can be extend to 
other cryptosystem easily. The analysis of the Nash equilibrium in this game shows 
valued guidelines to defender for a success protection.  
   
5.2. FUTURE WORK 
For the selective body biasing scheme, the future works include but are not 
limited to the following topics: 
1) The current optimization target is power, besides that, the area overhead 
should also be a very important factor in practice. When considering area 
overhead, choice of body biased gates will be a strong function of layout 
due to well design rules, routing complexity, etc. Therefore, in future 
work, area could be taken into account as the objective function or 
constraint to achieve the target of low area overhead. 
2) Monte Carlo simulations are used to verify the performance of design with 
selective body biasing, which is very timing consuming. The theoretical 
analysis of pass rate will be helpful to predict and evaluate the 
performance of the algorithm. Furthermore, the pass rate in closed form 
expression can also be involved in the constraint or optimization target.   
3) The formulation of selective body biasing is path based and in order to 
solve the scaling problem, representative path method is used. However, 
the extraction of the representative path still consumes considerable time 




For the second part job about the game theoretic approach on RDVS system, the 
following improvement could be done in future: 
4) Only random dynamic voltage scaling is considered in this dissertation, 
and it is worthwhile to consider random dynamic frequency. The game 
model can be extended to find out the optimal scaling frequency.  
5) There are various SCAs including SPA, DPA, CPA and LPA, etc. Only 
CPA is considered in this dissertation. It will be meaningful to study the 
resistance of proposed game theoretic approach to other popular SCAs. 
Furthermore, all experiments in this dissertation are based on FPGA, and 
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